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The Challenge of Regulatory Excellence
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Abstract
Regulation is a high-stakes enterprise marked by tremendous challenges and relentless public
pressure. Regulators are expected to protect the public from harms associated with economic
activity and technological change without unduly impeding economic growth or efficiency.
Regulators today also face new demands, such as adapting to rapidly changing and complex
financial instruments, the emergence of the sharing economy, and the potential hazards of synthetic
biology and other innovations. Faced with these challenges, regulators need a lodestar for what
constitutes high-quality regulation and guidance on how to improve their organizations’
performance. In the book Achieving Regulatory Excellence, leading regulatory experts across
various disciplines seek to provide the guidance regulators so often lack, and to elucidate what it
means to be an excellent regulator. This introductory chapter sets the stage for defining regulatory
excellence by clarifying regulators’ primary challenges, functions, and ultimate goals. The chapter
also emphasizes that even though regulation is widely associated with technical expertise,
excellent regulators must also focus on “people excellence” by building an internal culture that
fosters and reinforces humility, openness, empathy, and a steadfast commitment to public service.

The Challenge of Regulatory Excellence
Cary Coglianese*
In his bestselling book, Better, physician Atul Gawande explains why medical
professionals must strive to achieve excellence: quite simply, he says, because “lives are on the
line.” Gawande also notes that doctors “face daunting expectations” in situations where the
appropriate “steps are often uncertain” and with technical knowledge both “vast and incomplete.”
Doctors are nevertheless “expected to act with swiftness and consistency” and to “work humanely,
with gentleness and concern.”1
Gawande could just as well have been writing about regulators. Few government
professionals today work as vitally as regulators do on the front lines of human welfare. Around
the world, regulators are playing key roles in high-stakes efforts to protect their societies from
widespread harms associated with economic activity and technological change, all while
simultaneously promoting, or at least not unduly impeding, economic growth and development.
Not only do regulators work with many lives very much on the line, but they also face daunting
societal expectations, with vast and uncertain challenges that call for swift, consistent action as
well as humane, empathic interaction with the public and the businesses they oversee. They are
confronted as well with the need to integrate and achieve multiple objectives in a manner consistent
with democratic principles and the best available scientific knowledge.
Excellence has long been a human aspiration, in every field of endeavor. Ancient Greek
philosophers called it arête: “virtue” or, in what is thought the better translation, “excellence.”2
For the ancient Greeks, excellence was the key to human fulfillment, a vital aspiration for citizens
and rulers alike. Today, arête has assumed a much different and narrower meaning, as
mountaineers now use this term to refer to the knife’s edge of a mountain ridge. Yet that meaning
actually captures well the challenge regulators face in striving to achieve excellence. Like the
mountain climber traversing an arête, the regulator seeking excellence also has to navigate
carefully along a narrow path, facing criticism for regulating both too harshly and too laxly, where
one false step could produce serious adverse consequences.
Regulators working in all domains of economic and social policy continue to confront longstanding problems, such as controlling monopolistic pricing, reducing threats to public health,
avoiding environmental damage, and preventing financial calamities. They now face new
regulatory demands too, whether in response to rapidly changing and ever more complex financial
instruments, the emergence of the sharing economy, or the potential hazards of synthetic biology
and other innovations. In the face of both new and old risks associated with different forms of
economic activity, regulators must routinely make difficult judgment calls in the face of the
conflicting demands that society places on them. Society wants the benefits of risky economic
activity, but not the costs. In addition, with the rise of social media and expanding access to
information on the Internet, the social and political climate within which regulators conduct their
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work has changed, sometimes dramatically. While most regulatory officials previously labored
outside the public glare, many such officials today, in offices that no one had previously heard of,
find themselves embroiled in highly visible policy conflicts—or at least they know that they are
being watched more closely by a demanding public as well as by industry, nongovernmental
organizations, legislators, and courts.
Confronted with public pressures and competing demands, regulatory officials need a
lodestar for defining high-quality regulatory performance, and they need sound guidance about
how to improve their organizations’ performance. They need to know in what direction to aim and
how to determine whether they are making progress. These needs motivate this book. Its
contributors are internationally renowned scholars working in the fields of management, law,
economics, criminology, sociology, political science, and risk analysis. They have been asked to
place themselves in the shoes of the leaders of regulatory organizations and to explicate what it
would entail for those organizations to achieve excellence, or at least to be the best regulators they
can be. In other words, what makes a regulator excellent?
The open-ended nature of this question has presented each contributor with a significant
intellectual challenge.3 Scholars and policy analysts normally ask well-defined, incremental
questions, gradually gaining analytical precision, and building slow but steady momentum in
advancing knowledge. This approach is both a laudable and a valuable feature of the scientific and
policy analytic enterprise. But scholars and practitioners also benefit from creative reflection and
efforts to articulate bigger visions.4 This book takes the latter approach and seeks to expand,
synthesize, and innovate thinking about regulation, with the aim of giving its readers—government
officials, practitioners, scholars, and informed citizens—much-needed insight about what it means
(and what it takes) for a regulator to excel.
The intellectual challenge the contributors confront in this volume is more than theoretical.
The ideas they develop hold vital practical significance. Thoughtful, in-depth consideration of
regulatory excellence is long overdue and will likely continue to be needed for decades to come.
This book clarifies what regulatory excellence means, and it offers general guidance for those
regulators who undertake the climb toward its summit. In today’s complex, globalizing economy,
we should hope that regulators everywhere will join in such a journey.
What Regulators Do
A “regulator” can refer to an individual employee or official, such as an individual
inspector or the head of a regulatory body. But “regulator” can also refer to public or governmental
institutions. This book focuses on regulators as public institutions established to solve problems
by implementing and enforcing laws or policies, among other tactics, in order to steer the behavior
of individuals and organizations. Examples of regulatory institutions abound in all countries, at
both the national and subnational level of governments: the Alberta Energy Regulator, the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (or the
French Financial Markets Authority), the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority, and the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, to name just a few.

2

The ways that these regulators seek to solve problems vary, but by definition they tend to
involve the application or enforcement of regulation. A regulation is typically understood as a rule
backed up by consequences.5 To implement a regulation, regulators often issue permits or
approvals upon an applicant’s demonstration that the criteria specified in the applicable rules have
been satisfied. For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approves new drugs upon
finding them to be safe and effective. Regulators also inspect and monitor the behavior of the
individuals and entities subject to governmental rules, and they check to ensure that the outputs of
that private behavior comply with the rules. The U.K. Drinking Water Inspectorate, for instance,
both monitors drinking water quality in England and Wales and inspects water suppliers for
compliance with mandated protocols. When regulators find that rules have not been followed, they
may take a variety of actions to respond, from affirmatively helping the noncompliant entities
come into compliance to punitively taking enforcement actions and imposing fines.
But regulators are not only rule appliers and rule enforcers. They also take a variety of
other actions—from educating to subsidizing to adjudicating disputes, all in an effort to solve the
problems they have a responsibility to address. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for
example, devotes considerable effort to public education and has created dozens of voluntary
programs designed to encourage businesses to improve their environmental performance in ways
that go beyond mere compliance with regulations. In addition, regulators gather information and
produce research. They engage with different segments of the public, interacting not only with the
regulated industry and other government officials but also with a myriad of individuals and
organizations interested in or affected by the work they do.
Through their many different types of actions, regulators seek to respond to immense
societal challenges. The specific problems any regulatory institution aims to solve will depend on
the mandate it has been given by political leaders, with different regulators tasked with solving
different types of problems. That is why there are different fields of regulation and different
regulatory institutions associated with virtually every sphere of the economy: aviation safety
regulation, banking regulation, consumer product regulation, drug regulation, environmental and
energy regulation, food safety regulation, and so forth.
Although regulatory problems come in many varieties associated with nearly every part of
life, the major justifications for regulation are classically grouped into three categories that fall
under the concept of market failure and its three main types:6
— Concentrated power. Markets fail either when competition does not exist or when it
breaks down. If left unchecked, monopolies can generate higher prices or reductions in
service and access. Regulators that protect competition by combating price fixing and
market dominance, or that regulate prices and services of natural monopolies like public
utilities, are often referred to as “economic regulators.” Institutions that regulate the prices
of water, electricity, and natural gas are often justified as a response to the problem of
concentrated market power.
— Externalities. Markets work best when the prices of goods and services reflect their full
costs and benefits. But some market activities have spillovers; that is, their costs (or
benefits) are borne (or enjoyed) by third parties who are not involved in transactions for
3

the relevant goods or services. Environmental pollution is a classic example of a negative
externality, as the costs of pollution are imposed on community members who are not
compensated by market transactions with the entity creating the pollution. If negative
externalities are left unaddressed, the goods and services associated with the externalities
will be overproduced; firms will invest too little in methods for reducing those externalities.
— Information asymmetries. Markets also depend on the parties to economic transactions
having full information about what they are contracting over. But in many situations, one
party to an economic transaction lacks access to relevant information. A patient who buys
medication, for example, seldom knows as much as a pharmaceutical company does about
the medication’s effectiveness and its side effects. Some regulators mandate disclosure to
close the information gap.
Regulators also address many other kinds of problems, even if those problems do not fit
neatly within the three categories of market failure. For example, regulatory scholars increasingly
call attention to cognitive biases that prevent people from behaving in ways that serve their best
interests, which may justify certain kinds of regulatory interventions.7 In addition, regulators have
been set up to protect civil rights, promote equity, and combat discrimination—all ways of
advancing values selected by democratic legislatures but that are less easily justified by an appeal
to the concept of market failure. Often a regulatory institution will be charged with solving a
combination of several different types of problems at once.
Different regulators tackle different problems and oversee different industries, and their
place in a system of government, such as their degree of separation from the legislature can also
differ.8 Some are headed by a single director, while others are headed by a multimember body.
Some rely on funding from the legislature through normal governmental appropriations, while
others are funded through fees collected from industry. Most regulators can set their own
standards, norms, and directives to fill in gaps or provide clarity to laws created by legislatures or
other policymaking bodies, but the nature and degree of regulators’ rulemaking authority can vary
from one regulatory domain to the next.
Variation in the design of regulatory institutions and in the problems they are charged with
addressing means that no single, simple formula for success can apply across the board to all
regulators. Indeed, even in the same jurisdiction and policy domain, regulators frequently confront
a need to balance or choose among multiple or competing objectives, making any simple recipe
for success elusive. And yet, despite regulators’ varied mandates and institutional structures,
regulators around the world still share some features that make it reasonable to think of them
collectively and to consider their shared challenge of achieving excellence.
Common Features of Regulators
Across the world’s democracies, regulators share at least four commonalities: (1) a
delegated mission; (2) tremendous discretion combined with public accountability for the use of
that discretion; (3) complex, dynamic problems; and (4) a typically diverse set of regulated firms
with interests at odds (at least to some degree) with those of the regulator. These four common
features offer important implications for achieving regulatory excellence.
4

Mission. No matter what industries or types of problems regulators address, regulators
everywhere must solve problems in a way that delivers public value, such as by solving market
failures. Each regulator’s mission will be defined largely by its legislative mandate. In pursuing
this mandate, the regulator has an overarching responsibility to act in ways compatible with the
overall good of society.
Discretion with Accountability. All regulators possess discretion. The day-to-day
responsibility of implementing and enforcing laws brings with it a degree of discretion over the
regulator’s priorities, including what aspects of a problem to focus on or what rule violations to
target or overlook. In democracies, regulators are also accountable for how they use their
discretion. Accountability runs through to other governmental authorities, including the
legislature, as well as to the regulated industry, rights holders, community interests, and ultimately
the broader public.
Complex, Dynamic Problems. Regulators tend to face some of the most difficult challenges
in society – ones that often present value tradeoffs. These problems frequently involve complex
technological operations, social interactions, and new technologies—the very sorts of problems
about which there exists a great deal of uncertainty. Accident avoidance, for example, is a common
regulatory objective, but the sources of accidents can be both legion and interactive, making it
difficult to foresee every pathway that might lead to accidents in systems with highly complex
interactions of many moving parts. Regulatory problems are almost by definition problems that
markets cannot solve. They also are often the problems that legislatures cannot solve either,
whether for lack of expertise or lack of will. After all, if legislatures could solve all problems on
their own, societies would not need regulators. Sometimes the only way legislatures can act is to
build political coalitions based on broad or even unrealistic principles, such as principles that
combine mutually contradictory or at least competing objectives into a single but ambiguous
regulatory “mission.”9 When this happens, legislators are in effect telling regulators to surf the
crest of a treacherous wave, but then leaving it up to the regulator to figure out how to stand up on
the surfboard and do all the balancing and adjusting needed to stay afloat.
Regulated Entities. Success for regulators—unlike success in many other fields of
endeavor, such as eminence in the arts or sciences—depends to a large extent on the choices and
actions of others, namely, regulated entities. Those regulated entities, usually businesses, have at
least five important characteristics that affect the work of the regulator. First, regulated entities can
be highly diverse, comprising both individuals and organizations. The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, for example, regulates both individual stockbrokers and large
multinational corporations that issue stock. Second, many regulated businesses are themselves
large complex organizations that often use advanced technologies as part of their industrial
operations (such as nuclear reactors, to pick one example). The regulator is, in an important sense,
a “meta-manager” of regulated organizations: managing their managers. Third, many regulated
firms operate in a competitive market environment and, as a result, are constantly innovating with
new technologies, operations, and products. This dynamism presents challenges for regulatory
overseers, who must strive to remain current. Fourth, regulated firms are themselves institutions
that produce social value. Regulated businesses are employers in their communities and produce
valued goods and services that make life possible and worthwhile. Although their private interests
are not always fully aligned with the public interest—hence market failures—regulated firms’
5

conduct is seldom banned outright, unlike criminal behavior, which is enforced by police officers.
Normal business activities, whether automobile manufacturing, electricity transmission, or air
transportation services, are regulated, not treated as something like narcotics trafficking, which is
banned altogether. Finally, regulated firms are made up of thinking, strategic managers. The worldclass violinist does not have to worry about her violin actively moving its strings to avoid her
fingers or the bow. Regulatory enforcement officials, in contrast, find themselves engaged in a
dynamic, strategic interaction with those upon whom their success depends. The imperfect
alignment of regulated firms’ private interests with the regulator’s and public’s interests gives
firms reason to act strategically, complying with the letter but not the spirit of the law—or even
trying to evade detection altogether.
The combination of the four common features of regulators makes the attainment of
regulatory excellence different from, and often much more difficult than, excellence in other
domains. To an extent greater than most other professions or endeavors, a regulator’s performance
is ultimately affected by those who reside outside the regulatory institution itself. It is dependent
on a diverse and dynamic collection of other individuals and entities: not just regulated entities,
but also legislatures and elected officials, regulatory beneficiaries and their representatives,
advocacy groups, and other interested segments of the public.10 These diverse actors will seldom
share the same goals, and minority opinions and groups will exist that merit consideration. The
dependence of the regulator on these other actors should be plain to see, as the political metrics of
any specific regulator’s success will depend on those other actors’ goals (however conflicting they
may be), while its attainment of success against those metrics will crucially depend on choices
made by those within the regulated industry. The entities within that industry will themselves often
vary greatly in size and capacity (large vs. small, firms vs. individuals) as well as in their
willingness to cooperate (responsible compliers vs. recalcitrant laggards).11
Furthermore, regulators must often operate under changing conditions. Regulated firms are
not static; in a competitive business environment they face constant pressure to innovate. Scientific
knowledge changes with time, with a full understanding of a new technology’s risks often lagging
well behind technological change itself. Disruptive technologies emerge that upset wellestablished and well-understood economic patterns. For example, once widespread distributed
energy production becomes possible with advances in solar and battery technology, the role for
electric utility regulators will be dramatically altered. Public preferences can also shift over time,
as can electoral and legislative coalitions, even if laws themselves are not amended.
All of these factors—dependency, diversity, and dynamism—combine to make excellence
for regulators very different from excellence in other professional domains. They do not make
regulatory excellence unattainable, but they do make the task of regulation daunting and can make
it hard sometimes even to know when excellence has been achieved.
How Regulators Are Like Parents
It may help to see that a regulator’s challenge is not unlike that of a parent, for many of the
reasons just discussed. Success for both a regulator and a parent is in an irreducible sense out of
their hands; success for each is dependent. Even parents who are by all accounts excellent (caring,
nurturing, and wise) can have a child who turns out to be self-centered, rude, needy, or indolent.
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Likewise, examples abound of highly successful, self-actualizing individuals who had parents who
were, if not abusive, at least neglectful and decidedly subpar.
In addition, as parents with more than one child can attest, different children—even
twins—have different personalities and different needs. They are diverse. The best way to guide
one child’s growth may not work as well for another child, even within the same family. Although
fairness may require a degree of horizontal equity, parenting still requires recognizing children’s
differences and showing a willingness to adjust to meet each child’s needs. Obviously children are
dynamic too, in that they change as they grow. How a parent treats a three-year-old will not be the
best way to treat that same child at the age of ten, twenty, or thirty.
Regulators and parents have another thing in common: they only partially determine
outcomes. In other words, as important as they can be in shaping behavior, whether of regulated
firms or children, respectively, each is not the only important force affecting behavior. Children’s
behavior, and their ultimate success in life, will be shaped by more than just their parents. Nature
(genetic predispositions or other ingrained qualities, such as personality) and environmental
influences (teachers, peers, and the larger culture) matter. Similarly, much more than just the
regulator’s behavior influences the behavior of regulated individuals and organizations. Regulated
firms have their own version of “nature”—their organizational culture and other internal factors.12
They also respond to a variety of external factors in addition to regulation, including customer and
community pressures. It is sometimes said that a regulated firm operates under more than just a
regulatory license; it must comply with an economic license and a social license too.13
Recognizing the myriad nonregulatory factors that affect outcomes for a regulator leads to
two implications for regulatory excellence. First, to be successful, regulators will often need to
adapt their strategies to account for differences in these other economic and social factors.
Regulators will likely need to vary their levels of inspections, for example, during different stages
of the economic cycle, perhaps inspecting more frequently during times of economic distress. On
the other hand, regulators may need to inspect less frequently those firms that are located in denser
social networks where others—proxy “inspectors,” such as unions, business competitors, or
community groups—are keeping watch.14
Second, even when they take economic and social factors into account, regulators and those
who evaluate them should recognize that they will not always be able to control completely
regulated firms’ behavior or its resulting outcomes. Internal, economic, and social factors will
always matter, and to the extent that they overwhelm or counteract factors under the control of the
regulator, even the best regulators will not be able to prevent all problematic behavior or eliminate
all undesirable outcomes.
In the end, regulatory excellence is not the same as perfection. Even though managers of
excellent regulatory organizations will undoubtedly seek perfection, the reality is that even within
the best organizations mistakes sometimes happen, some of which might be tragic and
catastrophic. No regulator can guarantee that, among the many employees and managers within
the firms in a regulated industry, no one will ever make a mistake. Nor can regulators guarantee
that no one on their own staffs will make mistakes. And they should not claim to. After all,
sometimes mistakes provide valuable opportunities for knowledge generation.
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Regulating is itself a risky business, with risks from acting as well as risks from not acting.
A regulatory organization with an extreme culture oriented around the avoidance of all mistakes
would mistakenly delay acting at all. Too much risk aversion on the part of a regulator will be no
more conducive to regulatory excellence than too much risk taking.
Three Faces of Regulatory Excellence
In considering what makes a regulator excellent, different contributors to this volume view
a regulatory organization from three vantage points, focusing at different times on its
organizational traits, its actions, and the outcomes it achieves. In this respect, the contributors are
not unlike other analysts and professionals who work for or interact with regulators. The three
perspectives on a regulatory organization constitute three faces of regulatory excellence. Each is
vital. Indeed, Adam Finkel argues in chapter 11 that regulatory excellence requires an alignment
of all three faces so that they reinforce each other.15 Keeping the three faces of regulatory
excellence in mind will help in understanding the various visions and prescriptions found
throughout the chapters in this book.
When excellence is conceived in terms of the traits of a regulator, the focus is not on
specific actions or outcomes but rather on a general “state” of the regulator—a standing set of
tendencies, values, and resources on which the organization has to draw or a posture that it
generally holds in conducting its day-to-day operations and affecting outcomes in the world.
Adjectives such as “strong,” “well-funded,” “adequately staffed,” “credible,” “honest,” and
“legitimate” can be used to describe the regulator’s traits as an organization.
Another way to think of excellence lies in the type of actions a regulator takes, whether in
issuing rules, inspecting facilities, prosecuting violators, or undertaking other day-to-day work.
Adjectives sometimes used to describe a regulator’s actions include “vigilant,” “serious,”
“reasonable,” “evidence-based,” and so forth. Excellent actions may also be described in terms of
specific types of best practices—for example, “an excellent regulator targets the worst risks,” “an
excellent regulator uses flexible regulatory instruments,” “an excellent regulator adopts a problemsolving rather than a punitive approach to enforcement,” and so forth.
Ultimately, the traits of a regulator, as well as its actions, should lead to publicly valued
outcomes, such as reduced safety risks or improved market efficiencies. After all, that is what
makes people want to define excellence in terms of certain traits and actions, because they think
those traits and actions are connected to excellent outcomes. A regulator possessing the trait of
strength, for example, is thought to be more likely to achieve protective outcomes. A regulator
who acts by using flexible regulatory instruments is expected to achieve more cost-effective or
efficient outcomes.16
Desirable regulatory outcomes often define regulatory success. Sometimes these outcomes
are substantive ones, which can be characterized by criteria such as effectiveness (solving a
problem or achieving a desired outcome), cost-effectiveness (achieving a specific level of a desired
outcome – namely, a reduction in the problem – at a low cost), efficiency (balancing problem
reduction with other concerns, such as costs, so as to achieve an optimal level of reduction in the
problem), and equity (resulting in a fair distribution of the costs and benefits of regulatory action,
8

either across segments of society or over time). In addition, process-oriented outcomes often matter
too, such as legitimacy, credibility, and trustworthiness. Some of these process-oriented adjectives
are the same as ones used to describe general traits of a regulatory organization, but they can also
describe the outcomes of specific processes. For example, an evaluator might ask whether a
regulator’s public hearings leave members of the public feeling that they were listened to and
respected, and hence that the process resulted in a sense of legitimacy held by those affected.
Traits, actions, and outcomes all have a close bearing on each other. Traits can help
reinforce certain kinds of actions, while consistency in actions over time can help determine traits.
Both traits and actions, in turn, should affect outcomes. Given how all three faces interact, it is
clear that the challenge of regulatory excellence is multifaceted. To create and sustain excellence,
regulatory leaders must build and maintain an organization that fosters the kinds of regulatory and
operational actions that lead consistently to superior performance. This means that a regulator’s
leaders must give at least as much attention to how they manage their organizations as to what
kinds of regulatory policies they adopt and what types of enforcement strategies they follow. These
leaders must work to define a clear mission to their organizations, ensure that they possess
adequate financial and human resources, and maintain a culture that values the public interest over
expediency or the primary advancement of industry’s interests.
When it comes to their actions, regulators must proceed intelligently and follow, whenever
possible, evidence-based practices. Among the important actions an excellent regulator takes are
smart priority setting, sound problem solving, and empathic public engagement. Some actions will
expressly aim at achieving substantive outcomes by changing the behavior of regulated entities.
These actions will involve the design of regulatory instruments, choosing appropriately from
among traditional “command-and-control” approaches as well as more flexible forms of
performance-, market-, management-, or information-based approaches. They will also include
decisions about how to target enforcement resources, how to conduct inspections or other
oversight, and what types of consequences (penalties or rewards) to deploy for the desired
compliance or deterrence objectives.
Other actions will expressly aim at procedural or process outcomes. Given how much a
regulator’s success is dependent on others, the ways that a regulator interacts with industry, with
concerned members of the public, and with other governmental entities will prove instrumental to
its attainment of excellence. All things being equal, the more opportunities for engagement the
better, and earlier opportunities will almost always be better than later ones. Those who are
interested in regulatory decisions should have opportunities both to learn about what the regulator
is planning to do and to provide input. The regulator should not just “talk at” the public but should
strive to listen carefully to all those who have information and perspectives to contribute, without
bias toward one set of interests over another. Listening, of course, is not the same as agreeing.
Every interest group should not (and probably cannot) be made equally satisfied with a regulatory
decision. But regulators should still be respectful and empathic to all, especially to those adversely
affected by its decisions. In particular, regulators should provide the public with clear, transparent
reasons for their decisions.

9

Regulatory Excellence as “People Excellence”
Regulation is widely associated with technical expertise. After all, the issues regulators
confront are highly complex and demand in-depth knowledge of science, engineering, technology,
economics, and more. To achieve excellence, regulators must obtain detailed mastery of the
technical aspects of their work and the operations of the industries they oversee. Even if they
cannot match industry entirely in technical research and development, they must ensure they have
the in-house capability to assess the actions and associated risks of industry operations sufficiently
to be able to oversee the industry.
Yet as vital as it is for a regulator to possess adequate technical skill and knowledge, such
expertise is only one necessary component of regulatory excellence. By itself, it is not sufficient.
To move from good regulation to excellent regulation, the regulator also needs to master the people
side of regulation.17 Regulation, at its core, is relational. It is motivational. It is fundamentally
about affecting people’s behavior. The regulator is seldom directly fixing problems; rather, it is
working with and through members of the public to identify problems that need to be prevented
or redressed, and then working with and through the people in the businesses it regulates to shape,
steer, and change their behavior and to motivate them to prevent and redress problems. Moreover,
the problems regulators seek to redress are ones that affect other people, outside of the industry,
who take great interest in the work of the regulator, who want to know what it is doing about those
problems, and who want to have a voice in the regulatory process. The regulator also undertakes
its work in a setting that involves other people interested in that work who serve in other
governmental institutions, whether as elected or appointed officials, judges, or auditors. The
regulator, finally, is itself an organization filled with people who need to be managed, motivated,
and led effectively because what each employee does reflects on the regulator and affects its
performance.
It should be apparent by now that regulators seeking to achieve regulatory excellence need
to focus on “people excellence.” In part that means, of course, that the people serving in regulatory
organizations need to be technically knowledgeable and highly competent. But these organizations
also need to possess and sustain an internal culture that fosters and reinforces humility, openness,
empathy, and a steadfast commitment to public service on the part of all the people who serve in
the regulator’s name—and who serve on behalf of the public to which the regulator is accountable.
Only if the people working in a regulatory authority are committed to doing their utmost to deliver
public value, and to learning and improving in their ability to deliver that value through respectful
engagement with others, can a regulator hope to achieve true excellence.18
The Trail Ahead: Defining, Seeking, and Assessing Regulatory Excellence
For regulatory professionals around the world, the trail ahead will never be an easy one.
This book offers inspiration and guidance for improving the practice and performance of
regulation. Its purpose is to inform public officials as well as members of the public, students of
regulation as well as scholars of public management. It is intended to spark reflection as well as to
impart practical guidance and insight. Its lessons are, of course, necessarily general ones about
leadership and management in a regulatory context; this is not a “how-to” manual covering the
myriad specific techniques and concrete knowledge that regulators working in particular fields
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need to master. Rather, it offers meaningful but intentionally “big picture” perspectives on
regulatory leadership applicable to virtually any regulatory domain anywhere in the world, as
useful for those at a national banking authority as at a local zoning board. Many of the ideas
presented here have already found a receptive audience among leaders in fields as varied as public
education and public utility regulation.
The remaining chapters in this book are organized into three sections, each demarcating
three main challenges that any regulator confronts on its path to the summit of excellence:
understanding what it is that defines excellence for a regulator, then knowing what steps to take to
seek excellence, and finally being able to assess how much progress it has made. All three of these
challenges—defining, seeking, and assessing—are related to each other and cannot be separated
entirely, but the emphases provided in the chapters that follow do offer the reader thoughtful expert
advice about what regulatory excellence entails, how to achieve it, and how to know how well a
regulator is doing. Written by authors from different disciplines, countries, and substantive
specialties in regulation, these chapters offer a variety of views—many of them compatible with
one another, but also some with differing emphases—concerning each of the three challenges of
regulatory excellence.
In the first section, the contributors advance broad, often ambitious, visions for defining
regulatory excellence. In chapter 2, John Braithwaite emphasizes the importance of excellent
regulators making transformational impacts on industry and even throughout society in ways that
create significant public value. He cautions against focusing too much on the quality of the rules
on the books, and instead urges that excellent regulators are those who assume responsibility for
and end up solving society’s most important problems. In a similar spirit, Wendy Wagner argues
in chapter 3 that excellent regulators follow President Theodore Roosevelt’s advice to keep their
“eyes on the stars” (that is, prioritize the advancement of the public interest) while also keeping
their “feet on the ground” (maintaining expert, accessible, and fair decision processes). Wagner
emphasizes that the best regulators meet a series of vital process benchmarks that ensure that
regulatory decision-making exhibits robust public engagement, well-reasoned decisions, and
sound information-gathering strategies. Kathryn Harrison, in chapter 4, goes further to argue that
process virtues, such as procedural fairness, transparency, and honesty, are the “fundamental
underpinnings” of regulatory excellence in democratic societies. For Harrison, robust and fair
democratic engagement provides not the exclusive measure of regulatory excellence, but one that
technical experts within regulatory authorities too often overlook at their peril. In chapter 5, John
Graham and Paul Noe urge regulators to go beyond a focus on fair process and ensure that in the
end they actually achieve outcomes that significantly advance the well-being and overall welfare
of citizens. Graham and Noe acknowledge that procedural fairness is a necessary condition for
excellent regulation, but they say that getting the substance right and ultimately promoting
individual well-being throughout society is what determines whether excellence has been
achieved. Ted Gayer, in chapter 6, argues that the best regulators show humility and even some
degree of restraint before making substantive decisions, making sure to be guided by thoughtful
consideration of scientific evidence and proceeding with the recognition that ill-considered
regulation can cause its own kinds of harms. He offers suggestions for regulators to improve their
capacity for rigorously assessing the quality of the evidence available to them when they make
their decisions. Whether those decisions involve setting standards or targeting firms for inspection,
regulators must assess and manage risks, which leads Bridget Hutter, in chapter 7, to argue that
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excellent risk-based regulation requires, in addition to sound technical and scientific analysis,
careful consideration of a wide range of social, economic, and political values related to risks. She
calls attention to the widening of the regulator’s decision-making environment in today’s
interconnected world. In chapter 8, Robert Baldwin uses the concept of lucidity, which he defines
as a clarity of approach in delivering on the essential tasks of regulation, to argue that the excellent
regulator is defined by how attuned it is to its setting, how intelligent it is in knowing what it needs
to achieve, and how dynamically it responds to changes in its environment.
With these definitional insights about regulatory excellence established, the chapters in this
book’s second section provide guidance for how a regulator should go about seeking to achieve
excellence. Drawing on practices in the business world as well as on his experience leading a
regulatory agency with combined economic and social regulatory responsibilities, Daniel Esty in
chapter 9 outlines key strategies for achieving regulatory excellence, including a clear vision,
thorough analysis, and willingness to innovate. Shelley Metzenbaum and Gaurav Vasisht in
chapter 10 distill the essential ingredients for regulatory success down to a well-defined mission,
adequate funding, sound information, and thoughtful judgment in selecting tools to solve
regulatory problems. In chapter 11, Adam Finkel steps back and, after reconsidering the many
underlying virtues of an excellent regulator, argues that regulatory excellence depends both on an
alignment in a regulator’s traits, actions, and outcomes and on finding the “sweet spot” on a
spectrum of virtues that compete with each other. Neil Gunningham, in chapter 12, tackles what it
takes for regulators to achieve excellence in their compliance and deterrence strategies, arguing
that while common wisdom has implored regulators to select a single strategy, the best regulators
deploy different strategies that they combine in varying ways, depending on the context. In chapter
13, David Vogel provides a focused consideration of three case studies of successful regulation,
finding that the excellent regulatory officials in these cases worked to maintain public confidence,
strove for continuous learning, and interacted constructively with regulated industry. David LeviFaur builds on regulators’ need for learning in chapter 14, where he proposes that regulatory
excellence requires regulators to draw on diverse forms of expertise, including knowledge of
history and political science. In chapter 15, Howard Kunreuther and I consider how another
societal risk management tool—insurance—provides a model for regulation as well as
opportunities for building effective public-private partnerships that can contribute to regulatory
excellence. In chapter 16, Angus Corbett wraps up the advice for regulators who seek excellence
by arguing that successful regulators will adopt a systems orientation, using their resources to find
and exploit leverage points to influence systemic change in ways that achieve public goals.
The book’s final section turns to the challenge of assessing regulatory excellence. The kind
of learning and continuous improvement that contributors emphasize as an inherent component of
regulatory excellence demands that regulators regularly and systematically take stock of their
progress. It is not enough to try to achieve excellence; especially in a fast-changing world,
regulators need continually to assess their performance and adapt as needed. Toward this end,
Donald Moynihan, in chapter 17, offers regulators a set of practical but research-based
performance measurement principles to use as they measure their progress along the path toward
excellence. Among other things, Moynihan cautions against making too strong a connection
between measures of performance and incentives for regulatory employees. In the final chapter,
chapter 18, I distinguish the measurement systems needed for a regulator to become excellent from
measurement systems that purport to gauge whether a regulator is excellent, arguing that systems
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of the former kind (measurement for excellence) are more important than those of the latter
(measurement of excellence). This closing chapter serves as a reminder of this book’s underlying
premise, namely that regulators can do better by paying more attention to learning how what they
are currently doing is advancing public policy goals, hindering them, or neither. Only by
understanding better what works and what does not, and then by taking steps to adjust their
practices accordingly, can regulators meet the challenge of regulatory excellence.
Conclusion
The roles that regulators perform are vital to society, but the work they do is hard work.
Just regulating well is demanding and difficult. Achieving excellence requires more. It requires
full, consistent, and superlative mastery of all the technical, analytic, and social tasks involved in
the enterprise of regulating. Not only do today’s regulators oversee complex technologies and
business practices during the course of their work, but they also operate in complex social,
economic, and political systems where their success is ultimately defined and shaped by their
interactions with others, including, in the end, regulated entities. Moreover, regulators do not
operate in a static environment. Regulatory excellence requires listening attentively to changing
public concerns. It requires constantly learning on the job. It also requires boldness and visionary
leadership. The excellent regulator cannot stay in one place, content to have mastered the past or
the present. The world changes, its problems change, its science and technologies change, its
economic conditions change, and ultimately its social fabric can change too. In such a world,
regulatory excellence demands forward momentum. It is not a static achievement.
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